Will rising interest rates scupper the startup surge?

Investor and entrepreneur Anshu Sharma — formerly Storm Ventures, now CEO of privacy-focused SkyFlowasked on Twitter today well-nigh the connection between interest rates and technology valuations:

Ignore the compliments; Sharma was merely trying to morsel Jeff and me into engaging with his question. Which worked, as you can tell.

Sharma is someone with quite a lot of wits with both technology cycles and wanted flows, so he’s not asking the generic question — he wants us to go a level deeper on the concept. So, let’s poke at the interest rate/tech valuations conversation.


One reason why startups are worldly-wise to raise as much money as they are — record sums, recall — is today’s low interest rate environment.

Interest rates are slim virtually the world, which ways that money is cheap. Unseemly money ways that you can rent wanted for not a lot of cost. Coinbase, for example, is raising $2 billion in debt at the moment that will come due in two tranches. The first, due in 2028, will yield 3.375%, while the second half, due in 2031, will yield 3.625%. Coinbase raised its target from $1.5 billion to $2.0 billion thanks to investor interest. Money is inexpensive, so Coinbase is stacking a tuft of it on its side of the table from investors unable to find lower-risk, higher-yield places to stash their capital.

Cheap money ways that you can’t expect much from loaning out your funds; yoke yields are garbage today for that reason, which is unconfined for companies like Coinbase and less unconfined for wanted pools in search of yield. Those same buckets of mazuma have gone fishing in other locales hoping for increasingly profit per dollar, including the venture wanted market. Ample wanted has unliable venture capitalists to raise ever-larger funds, increasingly quickly, and has unliable non-traditional investors to prod into the startup market.

A good permafrost of the unicorn tattoo is predicated on this unseemly money moment we find ourselves in.

But nothing lasts forever, and with the U.S. government getting ready to start latter the taps on market-stimulating bond-buying, and sooner raising the domestic forfeit of money by boosting the target range for the Federal Funds Rate, there is an expectation that unrepealable resources will uncork to lose some of their luster.

If money becomes increasingly expensive, wanted can make increasingly money hiring itself to others; therefore, venture investing will wilt less lulu from a risk/reward perspective — again, in theory. At the same time, the stock market may reprice itself. Rock-bottom interest rates have led investors to buy up shares in growth-oriented companies considering those firms were expected to have increasingly valuation upside than similar investments into slower-growing companies were expected to post.

This particular trend hit its zenith last summer, when a number of industries were kneecapped by early-COVID restrictions and software stocks offered a way to still venery yield through the prism of corporate revenue growth, payable not in a regular coupon disbursement but via market value accretion.


In very wholesale terms, rising rates should make pouring wanted into venture wanted funds less lulu simply by making competing windfall allocations increasingly enticing. And rising rates may make the value-through-growth trade of public stocks less lulu as other shares trundling when into prominence.

There are technical explanations for the latter portion of our argument. Here are a few from the Sharma Twitter thread:

But Sharma is not really after that set of answers. He is instead questioning conventional wisdom. Why should it really be true, he’s asking, that tech stocks like Amazon and Salesforce will be worth less when rates rise — are they really worth less? In the Sharma worldview, rising software and e-commerce total addressable market has made those two companies worth increasingly than was previously anticipated; why should those gains go yonder if money gets increasingly expensive?

We have to move not in absolutes, but in understructure points, to get the treatise here. Interest rates, when they do change, will transpiration slowly. It doesn’t seem likely that many governments are going to rapidly spin the zombie on the price of money. Changes will come gradually, and with caution.

So whispered from sentiment shifts that might lead to related windfall price alterations, or wind up stuff increasingly lattermost than structural evolution, we shouldn’t really expect much transpiration to the key dynamics of the market today when rates begin to rise. Or, increasingly simply, a 25-basis-point transpiration to the Fed target rate (0.25%) won’t midpoint much by itself unless increasingly hikes are expected in a regular, rapid fashion.

The value of Amazon and Salesforce probably shouldn’t transpiration much when the price of money starts to tingle higher. If rates manage to hit 5%, then, sure, Amazon’s market cap will probably ripen in relation to the value of other assets, but that’s increasingly a comparative shift than a demand that Salesforce et al lose value.

Sharma is arguing the wiring specimen with a wink. He’s a software bull. But his question does raise a good point for us to chew on: When the underlying factors responsible for part of the tattoo in the value of software and the wave of investment into software do change, how quickly will valuations change? (Put flipside way, when what’s driving relative price appreciation of growth-oriented revenues compared to other resources and dollars flowing into SaaS changes, how fast will the results of those factors shift?)

Those anticipating a dramatic repricing of tech valuations by initial, incremental shifts to the price of money, I reckon, are expecting a bit increasingly of an exclamation point than they will unquestionably read.

This is why The Exchange wrote the pursuit the other week, when discussing the current startup tattoo and its potential durability:

But what we do think is possible to say with some certainty, or at least increasingly than when a rebalancing of wanted in the larger economy may occur, is that it will take a somewhat large shunt to knock the startup game off its current footing. Product demand coupled with funding interest is a killer combination for driving investment decisions — there’s wanted chasing yield, and high-growth companies looking for capital. It’s a match made in heaven.

Moreover, many investors we’ve spoken to during this reporting trundling have been bullish well-nigh the quality of founders and startups they have the option of investing in. There’s not only market demand and capital, but what’s stuff built to wordplay the first with the help of the second is pretty good, at least in the view of the folks writing seven-, eight- and nine-figure checks to the startups in question.

All merchantry cycles cycle. All things that go up sooner lose some altitude. But the want for startup shares and tech shares increasingly widely won’t come when to Earth at 1 g. Instead, a increasingly lunar-gravity descent seems increasingly likely. Pending something new, of course.

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